We propose an extension of the Applied Pi-calculus by introducing nondeterministic and probabilistic choice operators. The semantics of the resulting model, in which probability and nondeterminism are combined, is given by Segala's Probabilistic Automata driven by schedulers which resolve the nondeterministic choice among the probability distributions over target states. Notions of static and observational equivalence are given for the enriched calculus. In order to model the possible interaction of a process with its surrounding environment a labeled semantics is given together with a notion of weak bisimulation which is shown to coincide with the observational equivalence. Finally, we prove that results in the probabilistic framework are preserved in a purely nondeterministic setting.
Introduction
Security protocols are a critical element of the infrastructures needed for secure communication and processing information. Most security protocols are quite simple if only their length is considered. However, the properties they are supposed to ensure are extremely subtle, hence it is hard to get protocols correct just by informal reasoning. The history of cryptography and security protocols has a lot of examples where weaknesses of supposedly correct algorithms or protocols were discovered even years later. Thus, security protocols are excellent candidates for rigorous formal analysis. They are critical components of distributed security, are very easy to express and very difficult to evaluate by hand.
The use of formal methods for modeling and analyzing cryptographic protocols is now well-established. After the seminal paper by Dolev and Yao [11] , which introduced a simple and intuitive description for cryptographic protocols, many alternative definitions have been proposed on the basis of several approaches, ranging from modal logics to process algebras (see the calculi in [15, 25, 2] ).
Probabilistic models are nowadays widely used in the design and verification of complex systems in order to quantify unreliable or unpredictable behaviour in security, performance and reliability analysis. Probability is taken into account when analyzing quantitative security properties (measuring, in a sense, the security level of the protocol) or when dealing with probabilistic protocols. Probabilistic frameworks applied to security analysis are, just as an example, [3, 10, 20] ). In particular, in [20] Mitchell et al. introduce a variant of CCS allowing probabilistic polynomial-time expressions in messages and boolean tests. The semantics of the calculus schedules probabilistically the exchanged messages. The authors also define a form of asymptotic protocol equivalence that allows security properties to be expressed using observational equivalence.
In [1] , Abadi and Fournet introduce the Applied Pi-calculus, an extension of the Pi-calculus [18] with functions and equations allowing to treat messages not only as atomic names, but also as more complex terms constructed from names and functions. Such an extension gives rise to an important interaction between the new construct and value-passing communication allowing to model unforgeable capabilities. Applications to security are immediate. Moreover, the Applied Pi-calculus permits a general and systematic development of syntax, operational semantics, equivalences and proof techniques.
It has been remarked that the Applied Pi-calculus, thanks to its explicit substitutions, is similar to Concurrent Constraint calculi like CCP [24] , the ρ-calculus [21] and the CC-pi calculus [5] .
Bisimulation relations [17] are well-established behavioural equivalences and are now widely used for the verification of properties of computer systems. Actually, a property can be verified by assessing the bisimilarity of the considered system with a specification one knows to enjoy the property. Moreover, bisimulations can sometimes be verified automatically thanks to successful implementations of verification tools like, e.g., the Concurrency Workbench [7] or the Mobility Workbench [28] . It is also extremely important for bisimulations to be congruences in order to account on compositional behavioural equivalences.
Contribution
In this paper we introduce an extension of the Applied Pi-calculus, called Probabilistic Applied Pi-calculus (PAPi for short), where both nondeterministic and probabilistic choices are taken into account. The semantics of the resulting model is given by Segala's Probabilistic Automata [26] driven by schedulers which resolve the nondeterministic choice among the probability distributions over target states (see [27] ).
For the enriched calculus, we propose a notion of static equivalence (inherited from the Applied Pi-calculus) and a notion of probabilistic observational congruence. We also give a labeled semantics for modeling the interaction of a process with its surrounding environment. We derive a notion of weak bisimulation and show that it is a congruence relation coinciding with the observational equivalence defined for the unlabeled semantics. Finally, abstracting away from probabilities, we prove that results holding in the probabilistic version of the calculus are preserved within a purely nondeterministic framework.
As an application, we use PAPi to model and analyze the 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer protocol given in [12] . Such a protocol makes use of cryptographic operations and randomization to achieve fairness in information exchange.
Preliminaries
In this section we recall some preliminary notions about terms, equational theories and probability distributions. a 1 ) , . . . , (f n , a n )} consists of a finite set of function symbols f i each with an arity a i . A function with arity 0 denotes a constant symbol. Given a signature Σ, and infinite set of names and variables, the set of terms is defined by the grammar:
where , we rely on a sort system for terms. It may include a set of base types, such as Integer, Key, etc., or simply a universal base type Data. In addition, if S is a sort, then Channel(S) is the sort of those channels that convey messages of sort S. Variables and names can have any sort. We would use a, and c as channel names, s and k as names of some base type, and m and n as names of any sort. For simplicity, function symbols take arguments and produce results of base types only. In the following of the paper we always assume that terms are well-sorted and that substitutions preserve sorts.
Equational Theories. Given a signature Σ, we equip it with an equational theory E. An equational theory is a congruence over terms closed under substitutions of terms for variables (see [19, 9, 13] ). We require this equational theory to be also closed under one-to-one substitutions on names. We use the standard notation Σ M = E N when the equation M = N is in the theory E of Σ, and
In [1] one may find several examples of equational theories for the modeling of different kinds of cryptographic applications such as pairing, symmetric and asymmetric encryption, hashing, probabilistic encryption (modeled in a nondeterministic sense), signatures and XOR. We recall just some of them.
Algebraic data types such as pairs and lists could be defined by equipping a signature Σ with the binary function symbol pair and the unary function symbols fst and snd, with equations fst(pair(x, y)) = x and snd(pair(x, y)) = y. Now, the equational theory for algebraic data types consists of these equations and all the ones obtained by reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity and by substituting terms for variables. The sort system should enforce that fst and snd are applied only to pairs (alternatively a boolean function recognizing pairs may be added). Equations can be added to describe particular behaviours. For example, a constant symbol wrong can be considered such that fst(M ) = snd(M ) = wrong for appropriate ground terms M which are not pairs. In the following we use the abbreviations (M, N ) for pair(M, N ) and (L, M, N ) for pair(pair(L, M ), N).
A one-way hash function can be represented as a unary function symbol h with no equations. The one-wayness of h is modeled by the absence of an inverse while the fact that h is collision-free results from h(M ) = h(N ) only for M = N .
Symmetric cryptography (shared-key cryptography), is modeled via binary function symbols enc and dec for encryption and decryption with equation dec(enc(x, y), y) = x, where x represents the plaintext and y the key.
Asymmetric encryption can be modeled introducing two unary function symbols pk and sk for generating the public and the secret keys from a seed with the equation dec(enc(x, pk(y)), sk(y)) = x.
Sometimes, it may be useful to assume that encrypted messages come with sufficient redundancy such that decryption with a wrong key is evident. We may incorporate this property by adding equations dec(M, N ) = wrong for all ground terms M and
Probability Measures. A discrete probability measure over a countable set X is a function μ : 2 X → [0, 1] such that μ(X) = 1 and for each countable family
We adopt the convenient abuse of notation μ(x) for μ({x}). Let us denote by D(X) the set of discrete probability measures over X. Given an element x ∈ X, we denote by δ x the Dirac measure on x, namely, the probability measure μ such that μ(x) = 1.
Given two probability measures μ 1 , μ 2 and a real number p ∈ [0, 1], we define the convex combination μ 1 + p μ 2 to be the probability measure μ such that for
Recall that any discrete probability measure is the countable linear combina-
The Probabilistic Applied Pi-Calculus
In this section we introduce the Probabilistic Applied Pi-calculus (PAPi).
Syntax
The grammar of PAPi processes is obtained by extending the one for the Applied Pi-calculus with a nondeterministic (+) and a probabilistic (⊕ p ) choice operator:
The null process 0 does nothing; u M .P outputs the term M on channel u and then behaves like P ; u(x).P is ready to perform an input on channel u, then to behave like P with the actual received message replacing the formal parameter x; P + Q denotes a process which may behave either like P or Q; P ⊕ p Q behaves like P with probability p, like Q with probability 1 − p; P | Q is the parallel composition of P and Q; the replication !P behaves as an infinite number of copies of P running in parallel; νn.P generates a fresh private name n and then behaves like P ; if M = N then P else Q is the usual conditional process, it behaves like P if M = N and like Q otherwise. Note that M = N represents equality (i.e. with respect to some equational theory) rather than syntactic identity. We may omit a process when it is equal to 0.
As was done for the Applied Pi-calculus, we extend plain processes with active substitutions:
where P is a plain process. We denote with A the set of extended processes. We write {M/x} for the active substitution that replaces the variable x with the term M . The substitution {M/x} is like let x = M in..., with the ability to float and to apply to any process that comes in contact with it. By applying a restriction νx.({M/x} | P ) we obtain exactly let x = M in P . Intuitively, a substitution {M/x} denotes either a static public information known to every participant of the protocol, or it may appear when the term M has been sent to the environment, and the environment may not contain the atomic names appearing in M ; in this situation, the variable x is just a way to refer to M . We
We denote substitutions by σ, the image of a variable x according to σ as xσ and the result of applying σ to the free variables of a term T as T σ. In the following we identify the empty frame and the null process 0. Extending the sort system for terms, we rely on a sort system for extended processes. This should enforce that M and N are of the same sort in the conditional expression, that u has sort Channel(S) for some S in the input and output expressions, and that x and M have the corresponding sort S in those expressions. As done before, we omit the details of the sort system, and we just assume that extended processes are well-sorted. Names and variables have scopes which are delimited by restrictions and by inputs. As usual, we denote with f v(A) and f n(A) the free variables and names of A which do not occur within the scope of any binder νu and v(u). With bv(A) and bn(A) we denote the bound variables and names of A, respectively.
An extended process is closed when every variable is either bound or defined by an active substitution. With A C we denote the set of closed extended processes. We may use the abbreviation νũ for the (possibly empty) series of pairwise-distinct binders νu 1 .νu 2 . . . νu l .
Intuitively, we may see extended processes as plain processes extended with a context for the interpretation of their variables. As usual, an evaluation context is an expression (an extended process) with a hole. Formally, an evaluation context C[ ] is defined by the following grammar:
A frame is an extended process built up from 0 and active substitutions by parallel composition and restriction. The domain dom(ϕ) of a frame ϕ is the set of variables that ϕ exports (those variables x for which ϕ has an active substitution {M/x} not under a restriction on x). We assume all substitutions in a frame to be cycle-free, and that there is at most one substitution for each variable (and exactly one when the variable is restricted).
A frame can be viewed as an approximation of an extended process A that accounts for the static knowledge exposed by A to its environment, but not for A's dynamic behaviour. Given a probabilistic extended process A, with ϕ(A) we denote the frame obtained from A by replacing every plain process embedded in A with 0. For example, given the process
Semantics
Structural congruence (≡) is the smallest equivalence relation on extended processes that is closed (i) by α-conversion on both names and variables, (ii) by application of evaluation contexts, and such that:
Rules for parallel composition and restriction are standard. Alias enables the introduction of an arbitrary active substitution, Subst describes the application of an active substitution to a process in contact with it, and Rewrite deals with equational term rewriting. As pointed out in [1] , Alias and Subst
We let μ range over distributions over the classes of extended processes defined by the structural congruence relation. Namely The internal probabilistic reduction A − → μ, which describes a transition that leaves from A and leads to a probability distribution μ, is the smallest relation satisfying the following axioms:
A stuttering reduction (Id) is needed to deal with + and ⊕ p (see Example 1). Communication (Comm) is kept simple considering as a variable the message sent. There is no loss of generality since Alias and Subst can introduce a variable to stand for a term (see [1] ). Nondeterministic branching (NdBran) is as usual. Probabilistic branching (PrBran) results from the convex combination of probability measures. Comparisons (Then and Else) rely on the underlying equational theory E; using Else may sometimes require to apply active substitutions in the context in order to get ground terms M and N . Note that the only rule that gives rise to a probabilistic choice is PrBran, the other ones just return a Dirac measure.
Since reduction rules should be closed under application of evaluation contexts, we need to define extensions of the distributions μ such that given A − → μ we could define μ C such that There is a step from a process A to a process B through the distribution μ
An execution of A is a finite (or infinite) sequence of steps 
Finally, with e↑ we denote the set of executions e such that e ≤ prefix e , where ≤ prefix is the usual prefix relation over sequences.
Example 2. Consider again process
Since we allow nondeterministic choices, an extended process may behave in several different ways. Intuitively, the nondeterministic choice is among the possible probability distributions that a process may follow. Given a process A, we denote with behave(A) the set of the possible behaviours of A, i.e., behave(A) = {μ | A − → μ}. Hence, each possible probabilistic transition A − → μ can be seen as arising from a scheduler resolving the nondeterminism in A (see [27] 
We define the probability space on the executions starting from a given process A ∈ A, as follows. Given a scheduler F , σField A | last(e i ) ∈ H, for some i}. We define the probability of reaching a process in H starting from A according to the policy given by F as P rob 
Given a scheduler F , a process A and a measurable set of processes H ⊆ A, with Exec

Equivalences
In this section we recall the definition of static equivalence for frames introduced in [1] . We also introduce a notion of observational congruence allowing to argue when PAPi extended processes cannot be distinguished by any context. Contexts can be used to represent active attackers and observational congruence may capture security properties. For example, secrecy and authentication properties have been defined in this way in [2] for the Spi-calculus.
Static Equivalence
Two frames should be considered equivalent when they behave equivalently when applied to terms obeying a certain equational theory E. We denote this equivalence (also called static equivalence) with ≈ E . As pointed out in [1] , defining a static equivalence in presence of the ν construct becomes somehow delicate. Consider, for instance, the three frames:
where f and g are unary functions with no equations (two independent one-way hash functions). In ϕ 0 , since k and s are new, variables x and y are mapped to unrelated values different from any value a context may build. This also holds for ϕ 1 (even if f(k) and g(k) are based on the same fresh value, they look unrelated). Thus, a context obtaining values for x and y cannot distinguish between ϕ 0 and ϕ 1 . However, a context may discriminate ϕ 2 by checking the predicate f(x) = y. Hence, static equivalence is defined so that ϕ 0 ≈ E ϕ 1 ≈ E ϕ 2 .
Definition 1. Given an equational theory E, two terms M and N are equal in the frame ϕ ≡ νñ.σ (written (M = E N )ϕ), if and only if
Hence, for the previous example, we have (f(x) = y)ϕ 2 but not (f(x) = y)ϕ 0 .
Definition 2. Given an equational theory E, two closed frames ϕ and ψ are statically equivalent (written ϕ ≈ E ψ) when dom(ϕ) = dom(ψ) and for all terms
We
say that two closed extended processes A and B are statically equivalent (written A ≈ E B) iff ϕ(A) ≈ E ϕ(B).
Note that deciding static equivalence can be quite hard to check (it depends on E and Σ) [8] . The next lemma, proved in [1] , states a basic property of ≈ E .
Lemma 1. Static equivalence is closed by structural congruence, by reduction, and by application of closing evaluation contexts.
Observational Congruence
We write A ⇓ F p a (a probabilistic barb) when A can send a message on a with probability p according to the scheduler F , namely, when P rob 
C[A]RC[B] for all closing evaluation contexts C[ ].
The quantification on the schedulers means, intuitively, that given A ≈ B, for any possible behaviour (scheduler) of A there exists an analogous behaviour of B and viceversa.
As pointed out in [1] , if A ≈ B, then, for any test C of the form if M = N then a s else 0, where a does not occur in A or B, A | C and B | C should have the same barbs, thus implying static equivalence for A and B. As a consequence, the following lemma holds, stating that observational congruence is finer than static equivalence. A, B ∈ A, A ≈ B implies A ≈ E B. 
Lemma 2. Given
Labeled Semantics and Weak Bisimulation
In process calculi theory, a labeled semantics usually allows describing the potential interactions of a process with other ones that could occur in its environment. Such interactions are modeled by allowing the process to perform as many transitions as its active actions are. Each transition has the corresponding action as label and leads to a new process which corresponds to the result of the execution of that action. Moreover, a labeled semantics may include silent (or internal) transitions, usually labeled with τ , which describe the internal activity of the process, namely the interactions occurring between internal components of the system. Furthermore, the actions performed may include parameters. As an example, since the action of sending or receiving a message on a channel may require the transmitted message as parameter, one should explicitly show the parameter within the transition label.
Thus, to model the interaction of PAPi processes with the environment, a labeled operational semantics can be provided which defines a relation A In addition to the structural congruence rules and the internal reduction semantics of Section 3.2 (where each reduction rule should be equipped with the label τ ), we adopt the following rules:
There is a step from a process A to a process B through the distribution μ with label α (denoted A where A 0 , . . . , A k ∈ A and μ i ∈ D(A/ ≡ ) . With abuse of notation, we define Exec A , last(e) = A k , |e|, e j and e ↑ as for unlabeled executions.
Executions arise by resolving the nondeterminism on both α and μ. As a consequence, a scheduler for the labeled semantics is a function F assigning to a finite labeled execution e a pair (α, μ) ∈ behave l (last(e)).
Given a scheduler F and a process A, we define Exec A (τ * ατ * , H) be the set of executions that, starting from A, lead to a process in H via an execution performing an α action preceded and followed by an arbitrary number of τ steps. We define the probability P rob
Definition 4.
Weak bisimulation (≈ l ) is the largest symmetric relation R between closed extended processes with the same domain such that ARB implies:
for all schedulers F there exists a scheduler F such that for all classes
The following lemma states that given A ≈ l B and a closing evaluation context
Lemma 3. ≈ l is closed under application of closing evaluation contexts.
The next theorem derives immediately from the previous lemma.
Theorem 1. ≈ l is a congruence.
We can also show that ≈ l and ≈ coincide. Even if the notion of weak bisimulation does not include an explicit condition about contexts, it is still closed under application of evaluation contexts. As a consequence, ≈ l is simpler than the notion of observational congruence given in Definition 3. The following theorem holds. 
An Application
We give an implementation of the 1-out-of-2-oblivious transfer protocol (OT 1 2 ) in PAPi. The notion of oblivious transfer (OT) was first introduced by Rabin [22] in a number theoretic context and then generalized by Even, Goldreich and Lampel [12] with the OT 2 ; (C) for S, the a posteriori probability that R got M 0 (M 1 ) remains one half. Oblivious transfer is widely used in protocols for secure multiparty computation and has been shown to be rather efficient.
In order to describe OT 1 2 in PAPi, and recalling the notation in [12] , we should extend the equational theory for asymmetric encryption with two binary functions and such that (x y) y = x and the mappings x → x y and y → x y are permutations on the set of terms. Intuitively, when using RSA [23] , x y is implemented as reduction modulo N (the RSA modulus) of x + y, while x y is the reduction modulo N of x − y. The full list of equations is:
We are now ready to implement OT For simplicity we write input actions with multiple variables (this can be easily encoded with pair, fst and snd). S picks two fresh messages m 0 and m 1 and transmits them to R, together with the public key of the fresh secret e. The receiver R receives this triple and randomly (with probability 1 2 ) sends back to S the term T = enc(l, pk(e)) m i , for i ∈ {0, 1}. Since S does not know the secret value l, it cannot tell whether T has been obtained from m 0 or m 1 . S generates the messages T ij obtained by combining M i and m j and with probability 1 2 sends to R the M i combined with the right m j used by R. The flag 0 (1, resp.) is used to indicate that S used m 0 (m 1 , resp.) for the first part of the message. The receiver can now compute the secret (M 0 or M 1 ) from the right T ij and l. At the final step, R sends the value of the received secret on channel a.
Note that we do not consider equations of the form dec(M, sk(e)) = wrong when M is not encrypted with sk(e). Otherwise, S may be able to know which m j was used by R through the test dec(enc(l, pk(e)) m i m j , sk(e)) = wrong. Such a test is true only if i = j. In the case of i = j, S is able to compute the secret l as dec(enc(l, pk(e)) m i m j , sk(e)). This problem is avoided by using an asymmetric cipher (e.g., RSA), obtained with equations (4) and (5) such that enc and dec commute. In this way, the test never returns the value wrong and S cannot tell whether the result of dec(enc(l, pk(e)) m i m j , sk(e)) is l or just a random decryption.
By means of our notion of weak bisimulation we can show that the protocol implementation in PAPi, given the well-behaving sender S(M 0 , M 1 ) and receiver R, satisfies the OT 1 2 axioms. In particular, we can show that the receiver R receives M 0 or M 1 with probability 1 2 by checking the weak bisimulation of the protocol implementation with the process that simply outputs M 0 or M 1 on a channel a with probability 1 2 . Such a system, which captures axioms (A), (B) and (C) required by OT 1 2 , may be seen as the correct behaviour of the protocol. Namely, imposing a restriction on channel c, thus forcing synchronization among S and R, it holds that:
This can be proved easily, since νc.OT Figure 1 (probabilities equal to 1 are omitted). Notice that at each step there is just a probability distribution that a scheduler can choose (the only nondeterministic choices are among blocking schedulers).
A Conservative Extension
Many process algebraic approaches are non-probabilistic and, in general, probabilistic choice can be approximated by suitable nondeterministic mechanisms. Using probabilistic features, however, provides stronger safety and security guarantees. We give formal substance to this claim (Proposition 1 below), by showing that ≈ is a conservative extension of an appropriate notion of observational congruence for the purely Nondeterministic Applied Pi-calculus (NAPi), obtained by removing the probabilistic choice operators from the syntax of plain processes.
With A NP we denote the set of extended processes in NAPi. The internal reduction A − → A , becomes now the smallest relation on A NP closed by structural congruence and application of evaluation contexts such that:
Given a process A ∈ A we define the plain process A NP ∈ A NP obtained by replacing each probabilistic choice operator appearing in A with a purely nondeterministic choice operator.
As an example, given
Note that NAPi essentially results in the Applied Pi-calculus given in [1] enriched with a nondeterministic choice operator. Actually, the lack of an explicit nondeterministic choice operator in [1] is not a real limitation since it can be derived by means of restriction and parallel composition in the standard way.
The notion of observational congruence introduced in the probabilistic framework (see Definition 3) can be rewritten for the purely nondeterministic case.
For The following proposition states that removing probabilities from two observationally equivalent probabilistic extended processes the equivalence is preserved in the purely nondeterministic setting. Hence, if a system satisfies an observational equivalence property in the probabilistic setting, its nondeterministic counterpart does still satisfy the property in the nondeterministic setting. The converse implication does, in general, not hold, since systems satisfying a property in the nondeterministic setting may turn out to lose the property in the more expressive probabilistic framework. 
Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced the Probabilistic Applied Pi-calculus (PAPi), an extension of the Applied Pi-calculus ( [1] ) for dealing with probability, nondeterminism and equations (which are shown to be rich enough for modeling the most common cryptographic operations). We have given a labeled operational semantics and a labeled weak bisimulation, which we have then shown to be a congruence. As one expects, the results given in the probabilistic framework are preserved with respect to the results given in the non-probabilistic one.
As an application, we have shown how PAPi applies to the OT 1 2 protocol where probability and cryptographic operations play an important role. While we just prove the correct execution of the protocol for two given parties, it would be quite natural to develop a framework for the analysis of security properties (as, for example, in [2] ) in order to prove more general properties.
As another possible future application, we mention, just as an example, sensor networks, for which: (a) environmental distributed sensing can be modeled with a nondeterministic choice among input channels waiting for external stimuli; (b) randomization is crucial (see the probabilistic routing policies introduced in [4] , or the randomized sleeping architecture proposed in [6] ); (c) cryptography is fundamental when dealing with secure wireless communication. Notice, moreover, that thanks to the generality of equational theories, PAPi can also be applied to domains different from security.
